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INTRODUCTION 
Framing the topic of this symposium as “Human Rights Litigation in State 
Courts and Under State Law” effectively orients the discussion around the rights 
of plaintiffs from the outset, the central question being whether they have 
enforceable rights in U.S. state courts under state law. Standing in the way are 
various legal doctrines. In broad strokes, the relevant questions become: Which 
doctrines do, or should, either facilitate or obstruct human rights litigation in U.S. 
state courts and under state law? How are courts applying these doctrines? How 
should courts apply these doctrines? 
Many of the doctrines that potentially stand in the way of human rights 
claims in state court and under state law reflect the interests of states—including 
U.S. states, the United States, and foreign nations. State-centered doctrines like 
sovereign interference,1 comity,2 preemption,3 governmental interest analysis,4 the 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The authors 
thank Bill Bridge for helpful comments. 
** Law Clerk to the Honorable W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas; B.A., Southern Methodist University, 2006; J.D., cum laude, Southern Methodist University 
Dedman School of Law, 2010. 
1. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
2. See id. at 63–65. 
3. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
4. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 69–70. 
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political question doctrine,5 and other doctrines deferential to the political 
branches6 threaten to block human rights litigation in state courts and under state 
law. The discussion thus tends to boil down to human rights versus states—or, 
perhaps more accurately, plaintiffs’ rights versus legal doctrines that capture some 
non-human rights interest of states.7 
This contribution aims to add another rights dimension to this rapidly 
evolving doctrinal and normative puzzle by reorienting the discussion around the 
rights of defendants. More specifically, we ask whether there are defendants’ rights 
that may counterbalance plaintiffs’ rights in some situations. We believe there are, 
and that these rights can and should inform how courts decide human rights cases 
in state courts and under state law. Because our primary concern is choice of law 
as opposed to choice of forum, we focus principally on issues related to the 
application of state law rather than on issues related to state courts entertaining 
suit. 
As to the choice of law, we use the concept of what we will refer to as 
“spatial legality” to identify and frame two main rights: the right to fair notice of 
the law, and the right to compliance with the law.8 We then apply these rights 
through the Due Process Clause to show how they can and should influence 
human rights litigation under state law. First, we conclude that even if personal 
jurisdiction exists over a defendant, if the conduct giving rise to the suit exhibits 
no jurisdictional nexus to the United States, application of purely U.S. law—like 
state tort law—may violate defendants’ rights to fair notice of the law. Second, we 
suggest that where purely U.S. law—like state tort law—prohibits or creates 
liability for conduct compelled or required under foreign law in the place where 
the conduct occurs, defendants may have a due process objection because 
compliance with the law is impossible. Finally, we argue that both of these 
objections largely vanish where the U.S. law sought to be applied to foreign 
conduct implements an international law that imposes liability. 
This last point highlights the principal caution we would like to sound in this 
contribution: the main device for bringing human rights claims in federal court by 
foreigners against foreigners for conduct abroad thus far has been the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS),9 which to some degree incorporates international norms that 
 
5. See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 335 (11th Cir. 1992). 
6. Although we’ve mentioned the political question doctrine already, there are other doctrines 
that also encourage more case-specific deference to the political branches. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d at 58–64; Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16–19 (D.D.C. 2005). 
7. One could, of course, anthropomorphize the state to say that it, too, has “rights.” Apart 
from other obvious distinguishing features, however, that does not reflect how courts describe state 
interests in these cases. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 59–62 (evaluating the “interests of the 
United States”). 
8. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 72 (2012) . 
9. The ATS gives federal courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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purport also to apply in the foreign territory where the torts occur.10 However, 
when U.S. litigation relies on uniquely U.S. law—like state tort law—the potential 
for both unfair surprise and conflicts with foreign law grows, and may even grow 
so large as to present problems of a constitutional dimension, rendering 
application of U.S. law unfair under the Due Process Clause. 
So far, courts have tended to avoid these constitutional problems through 
other doctrines like forum non conveniens or choice-of-law tests that point to the 
law of the place of the conduct and the harm.11 But this does not always happen. 
In fact, as we will show, various stages in these characteristically long and complex 
cases may have already raised such issues. In any event, our purpose is to throw 
potential problems up on the radar screen before, rather than after, they arise.12 
Especially in areas like choice of law and extraterritorial jurisdiction, where courts 
have a great deal of discretion and the methodologies themselves tend to be quite 
flexible,13 this is a worthwhile exercise. And because the barriers we erect are 
constitutional, they are exogenous to those methodologies and, we hope, may 
provide both useful outside constraints and discernable parameters in which 
courts may operate when making choice-of-law determinations. 
In 1979 nobody could have envisioned the explosion of human rights 
litigation in federal court under federal law. And, in many ways, the law is still 
trying to catch up to address the myriad issues such cases have raised. It is 
presumably the aim of this symposium not only to discuss issues that have been 
addressed already in human rights litigation in state court and under state law, but 
also to identify and analyze some of the unique questions that may arise going 
forward. 
 
10. Though, of course, heated debate exists as to the scope and nature of this incorporation. 
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (defining the ATS as “a jurisdictional statute 
creating no new causes of action” because “the common law would provide a cause of action for the 
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time”); 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he question of federal jurisdiction under 
the Alien Tort Statute . . . requires consideration of the law of nations.”). For post-Sosa analysis of 
incorporating international norms, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that “ATS jurisdiction [i]s limited to claims in violation of universally accepted norms” 
under international law), and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 
(2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain established the “principle 
that the scope of liability for ATS violations should be derived from international law”). 
11. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 70 (holding that Indonesian, not U.S., law applied 
to alleged conduct and harms in Indonesia). 
12. But see Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., No. 96-2139, 1996 WL 601431, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 17, 1996), a suit brought on behalf of Indonesians against a U.S. mining corporation for alleged 
international human rights violations, foreign environmental damages, and personal injuries. The case 
was removed to federal court but later remanded. Id. at *10. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, 
however, found that the foreign plaintiffs failed to plead their claims with sufficient particularity and 
were unable to amend their pleadings. Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 811 So. 2d 98, 102 (La. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
13. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 7 (3d ed. 2012). 
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I. SPATIAL LEGALITY: FAIR NOTICE 
The concept of legality, or nonretroactivity of the law, is fundamental to any 
sophisticated legal system. It stands for the basic rule-of-law principle that actors 
must have fair notice of the law at the time they act.14 Framed as a right, legality 
thus ensures fair notice of the applicable law by disfavoring the legal prohibition 
of activity after it occurs. In this respect, the principle is generally thought of in 
terms of time: if the law prohibiting an activity did not exist when the activity 
occurred, the law cannot reach back in time and apply to that activity. This 
requirement that law exist in time before it can apply—what we might call 
“temporal legality”—is captured in U.S. law in the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto 
Clause when it comes to legislative enactment of criminal laws15 and in the Due 
Process Clause when it comes to judicial scrutiny of both criminal and civil 
statutes.16 The principle also exists in international law.17 And it is generally how 
legality works within a single sovereign’s jurisdiction: actors are deemed on notice 
of the law at the time they act, but it is unfair to subject their activity to a legal 
prohibition that comes into existence after the activity takes place. 
Spatial legality seeks to cast this fair notice right across space as well as time. 
In particular, the concept has important purchase in systems comprising multiple 
sovereigns with multiple jurisdictions. Unless every state’s law applies everywhere, 
spatial legality will have some traction because situations will invariably arise in 
which an existing law (in time) does not apply to activity (in space). The concept 
of spatial legality has been more fully explicated and its contours and implications 
explored in greater detail elsewhere,18 but its essence can be captured in a simple 
hypothetical scenario. 
Posit a system of more than one state—say, a system comprising State A and 
State B. Now suppose that State A law does not apply to everything that happens 
in State B, and vice versa. If Jane acts in State A, and at the time she acts State B 
law does not apply to her activity, it would violate the principle of spatial legality if 
 
14. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 53 (rev. ed. 1969); Jeremy Waldron,  
The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW, 4 (James E. Fleming 
ed., 2011). The Latin expression, “nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,” is probably as well known 
as the English version, “no crime without law, nor punishment without law.” Paul H. Robinson,  
Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 336 (2005). 
15. “Ex post facto” translates to “from a thing done afterward,” or “[a]fter the fact; 
retroactively.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
386, 390–92 (1798). 
16. While the Supreme Court has construed the Constitution’s express prohibitions on ex 
post facto laws to apply only to criminal statutes, see Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390–91, due process 
places limits on retroactive civil statutes as well, see, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & 
Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728–30 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976). 
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. 
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
18. See Colangelo, supra note 8, at 77–82. 
UCILR V3I1 Assembled v9 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2013  10:52 AM 
2013] SPATIAL LEGALITY, DUE PROCESS, AND CHOICE OF LAW 67 
 
State B later applied its law to Jane for her act in State A. This is so even if State B 
law existed in time when Jane acted. Here it is the reach of the law in space as 
opposed to its existence in time that catches Jane by surprise. Although spatial 
legality focuses on law’s reach in space rather than its existence in time, the fair 
notice problem is basically the same: someone is being subjected to a law she 
could not reasonably have expected would govern her conduct when she engaged 
in it. 
This type of spatial legality problem arises in multistate systems when a state 
gains personal jurisdiction over a defendant and then seeks to use that personal 
jurisdiction to justify applying the state’s laws to the defendant’s prior 
extraterritorial activity. Thus, in the scenario above, if State B courts gain personal 
jurisdiction over Jane—suppose she finds herself in State B via extradition, 
abduction, or just travels there on vacation—State B may claim personal, or 
adjudicative, jurisdiction over her. State B cannot, however, use this personal 
jurisdiction over Jane to apply State B law, or prescriptive jurisdiction, to her 
activity in State A if State B could not have regulated the activity when it occurred. 
The concept of spatial legality argues that to apply State B law in this situation not 
only would be inconsistent with existing jurisdictional rules of international law 
(though both U.S. and international courts sometimes get this wrong),19 but it 
would also violate Jane’s right to fair notice of the applicable law. In other words, 
spatial legality takes extant prescriptive jurisdiction rules among states at the time 
of Jane’s conduct and transforms them into an individual right for Jane to fair 
notice of the applicable law when she acts, where she acts. 
Having now set out the concept of spatial legality, the important doctrinal 
and practical question for present purposes is whether defendants can avail 
themselves of this fair notice right in U.S. courts in civil cases involving state law. 
They can. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has used the Due Process Clause to 
invalidate retroactive application of the law in both the criminal and the civil 
context.20 Moreover, the Court has done so in a spatial legality sense by imposing 
limits under the Constitution on a state’s ability to choose its law to govern activity 
outside its borders, even where the state has personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
This Supreme Court jurisprudence holds powerful analogical value for litigants 
contesting the application of U.S. state law to their foreign conduct. The Court 
has held “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally 
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”21 The “touchstone”22 of this due 
 
19. See id. 
20. See supra note 16. 
21. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion)). 
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process test is, according to the Court, protecting parties from “unfair surprise or 
frustration of legitimate expectations” resulting from the application of a law they 
could not have reasonably expected would govern their conduct when they 
engaged in it.23 
On this basis, the Supreme Court has refused in the interstate context to 
credit a party’s postconduct move to a forum state as a contact sufficient for the 
state to constitutionally apply its law to out-of-state conduct at issue in the suit.24 
In the Court’s words, “a postoccurence change of residence to the forum State [i]s 
insufficient in and of itself to confer power on the forum State to choose its 
law.”25 Moreover, the interstate cases suggest that just because a forum state has 
general personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that does not mean the state can 
automatically apply its laws to the defendant’s out-of-state conduct.26 Analogically, 
these cases supply strong arguments for foreign defendants against the application 
of U.S. laws—and, we shall argue, especially uniquely U.S. state laws—to their 
conduct abroad if the only contact with the U.S. forum is either: (a) a postconduct 
move to the United States, or (b) the forum’s general personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant unrelated to the foreign conduct at issue in the case. It is well 
established that the Due Process Clause protects foreign defendants in U.S. 
courts.27 The crucial question in this context is how.28 
A. Postconduct Presence 
As we have seen, the principle of spatial legality holds that just because a 
state has adjudicative jurisdiction to subject parties to judicial process does not 
mean that state necessarily has prescriptive jurisdiction to apply its laws to the 
parties’ conduct, especially conduct that occurred outside the state. Thus parties’ 
presence in the United States may authorize U.S. courts with personal jurisdiction 
to subject those parties to judicial process. But such presence does not, in and of 
itself, authorize U.S. courts to apply U.S. law, including state law, to the parties’ 
prior activity outside the U.S. forum in ways that defeat the parties’ reasonable 
expectations or fair notice of the applicable law. 
Recent human rights cases are raising precisely this choice-of-law issue. For 
instance, in Mamani v. Berzaín, Bolivian plaintiffs sued former Bolivian president 
 
22. Hague, 449 U.S. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality’s test, but not the 
application of the test to the facts). 
23. Id. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
24. Id. at 319. 
25. Id. (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)). 
26. See generally id.; John Hancock Mut., 299 U.S. at 182; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 
408 (1930). 
27. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987). 
28. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 751–52 (2012) (“[W]hat the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires in the international context is less than clear.”). 
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Sánchez de Lozada and former minister of defense Sánchez Berzaín in federal 
court in Florida.29 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were involved in targeted 
killings of Bolivian civilians in 2003 that violated, among other things, 
international norms against extrajudicial killing and crimes against humanity.30 
Although ATS claims predominated the complaint, plaintiffs also argued that 
supplemental jurisdiction existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Florida state 
law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligence, and also alleged wrongful death without 
specifying the applicable law.31 Personal jurisdiction over both defendants existed 
because they had moved to the United States after the alleged conduct.32 Lozada 
left Bolivia in October of 2003 and became a Maryland resident, and Berzaín left 
Bolivia around the same time and became a Florida resident.33 
The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.34 Although our primary concern is the adjudication of the state law 
claims, a brief digression into the disposition of the ATS claims will help frame the 
litigation stakes. The district court found that seven of the nine plaintiffs had 
pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim under the ATS for extrajudicial killings, 
and that all plaintiffs had pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim under the ATS 
for crimes against humanity.35 Defendants were then granted permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal on the ATS claims.36 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed all of the ATS claims for 
failure to plead facts sufficient to state a claim.37 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court of appeals—without citing a single international law source—found that the 
claims were pitched at too high a level of generalization and were therefore not 
actionable under the ATS, which was, according to the court, “no license for 
judicial innovation.”38 Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to engage 
international law sources stemmed from the court’s unfamiliarity with them or 
something else is impossible to know. But it highlights a certain judicial 
discomfort with delving into international law that plaintiffs may face in ATS 
 
29. Mamani v. Berzaín, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
30. Id. at 1328–29. 
31. See Corrected Amended Consolidated Complaint at 22–27, Mamani, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326 
(No. 07-22459-CIV). 
32. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Mamani, 636 F. 
Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009) (No. 07-22459-CIV). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 40. 
35. Id. at 25–31. 
36. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal at 5, 
Mamani, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (No. 07-22459-CIV). 
37. Mamani v. Berzaín, 654 F.3d 1148, 1156–57 (11th Cir. 2011). 
38. Id. at 1152. In this connection, the court’s statement that “[t]he scope of what is, for 
example, widespread enough to be a crime against humanity is hard to know given the current state of 
the law,” id., makes a certain degree of sense if one doesn’t look to the law. 
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suits. And this potential discomfort may, in turn, lead to a strategy of adding state 
law claims. It so happens this exact strategy has succeeded to a limited extent so 
far in Mamani. 
As to the state law tort claims, defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that they were time-barred under Maryland and Florida law and, moreover, 
involved novel and complex issues of state law such that dismissal was appropriate 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.39 As noted, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims were brought 
under Florida law, but plaintiffs did not specify what law governed their wrongful 
death claims.40 The district court found under Eleventh Circuit precedent and 
choice-of-law principles that when a party does not allege the law of a sister state 
or another nation applies, Florida law will generally be assumed to control.41 The 
court thus found that plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims would proceed under 
Florida law.42 
To address the statute of limitations question, however, the court engaged in 
another choice-of-law analysis. While defendants argued that the claims were 
barred by the Maryland statute of limitations as to Lozada and by the Florida 
statute of limitations as to Berzaín, plaintiffs argued that the claims were not 
untimely because Bolivia’s statute of limitations applied.43 Using the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws’ most significant relationship test, the court determined 
that Bolivia had the most significant relationship to the statute of limitations 
issue.44 And, because under Bolivian law the relevant statute of limitations for 
wrongful death mirrored the Bolivian criminal statute of limitations, the claims 
were timely. However, because the other Florida tort claims did not constitute 
crimes under Bolivian law, Bolivia’s standard three-year civil statute of limitations 
applied and the claims were dismissed. Accordingly, at this point in the litigation 
the only claims that have survived appear to be tort claims under Florida law. 
What differentiates Mamani from the many federal cases that have come 
before it in which foreigners have sued foreigners for human rights abuses abroad 
is not the lack of a U.S. connection save for the parties’ postconduct move to the 
United States. In probably the most well-known lower court case under the ATS, 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, Paraguayan plaintiffs brought suit in U.S. court against a 
 
39. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss at 47–49, Mamani v. Berzaín, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326 
(S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 07-22459-CIV), 2008 WL 2913425. 
40. Corrected Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 31, at 22–24. 
41. See Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441–42 (11th Cir. 1998). 
42. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, supra note 32, at 35. 
43. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss at 45–46, Mamani v. 
Berzaín, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 07-22459-CIV), 2008 WL 2913427. 
44. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, supra note 32, at 36–37. 
The court avoided a comprehensive analysis under the significant relationships test by examining a 
Florida Supreme Court case with relatively similar facts. See Fulton Cnty. Admin. v. Sullivan, 753 So. 
2d 549, 551–52 (Fla. 1999). 
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Paraguayan defendant for torture in Paraguay.45 Instead, the differentiating feature 
in Mamani is the law, or more accurately, the laws under which the suit has 
proceeded. The court in Filártiga famously held under the ATS “that deliberate 
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted 
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the 
parties.”46 Mamani now asks, what about Florida tort law? More pointedly, what if 
the conduct alleged does not rise to the level of an international law violation for 
which liability attaches, but does constitute a tort under U.S. state tort law? While 
foreign actors may be deemed on notice that torture “violates universally accepted 
norms of the international law of human rights,” they may not reasonably have 
been on notice that Florida state tort law would apply to their conduct. 
Two things probably need to happen for the Due Process Clause to prevent 
the application of forum law in this type of situation: one, there must be a conflict 
between U.S. forum and foreign law, and two, the U.S. court must choose U.S. 
forum law.47 As to the first prong, it may be easy to locate equivalent causes of 
action in the foreign law of the place where the conduct occurred to torts in U.S. 
state law, though some foreign jurisdictions certainly do not have equivalents to 
U.S. torts like intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.48 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly in cases alleging human rights abuses 
abroad, there must be liability for the particular foreign actor under foreign law, 
something that may be difficult to show in cases involving state action.49 
As to the second prong, the U.S. court, either through a very flexible or a 
very bad choice-of-law analysis, would choose forum law—a choice that while 
perhaps unlikely is not inconceivable. For example, U.S. courts may be inclined to 
liberally choose forum law in a “justice administering state” intent upon 
“maximizing the tort recovery of plaintiffs,”50 or where U.S. courts apply forum 
law as a default rule because they find foreign law “radically indeterminate,”51 not 
a far-fetched scenario given the nature of the legal systems in many of the places 
where the harms are alleged to have occurred in human rights cases.52 In the 
 
45. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–80 (2d Cir. 1980). 
46. Id. at 878. 
47. Naturally, defendants also likely would have to timely object to the application of forum 
law on due process grounds, or else the objection could be waived. 
48. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(finding “that a true conflict exists between California law and Nigerian law” because “Nigerian law 
does not recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, civil conspiracy, [or] loss of consortium”). 
49. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2005) (involving 
PT Arun LNG Co., “an entity that is 55% owned by Pertamina, Indonesia’s state-owned oil and gas 
company”). 
50. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. 1978). 
51. Doe v. Unocal, No. BC 237980, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003). 
52. Id. (refusing Unocal’s request to apply Burmese law on public policy grounds because 
Burmese law would not recognize the forced labor claim in the absence of an independent judiciary). 
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combination of these two scenarios, due process acts as a species of side 
constraint53 to block the application of state tort law to foreign conduct in a way 
that would defeat defendants’ reasonable expectations about the law applicable to 
their conduct when and where they engaged in it. In this respect, the Due Process 
Clause places outer limits on the U.S. court’s choice of its own law to regulate 
conduct abroad. 
At this point we should stress, however, that if the conduct violates an 
international norm for which liability exists, a spatial legality approach operating 
through the Due Process Clause would not preclude application of U.S. law to the 
purely foreign conduct where defendants are found in the United States. Linder v. 
Portocarrero,54 another case out of the Eleventh Circuit, offers a good illustration. 
Plaintiffs, acting as representatives of decedent Benjamin Linder’s estate, brought 
suit against defendants in Florida for ordering the torture and execution of Linder 
in Nicaragua during the civil war there.55 The court refused on political question 
grounds to entertain a majority of claims that would have required judging the 
legitimacy of a foreign civil war and various related operations but allowed tort 
claims under Florida law to proceed. The court explained, “there is no foreign civil 
war exception to the right to sue for tortious conduct that violates the fundamental 
norms of the customary laws of war.”56 Indeed, relying on Filártiga—among other 
sources—the court observed, “All of the authorities agree that torture and 
summary execution—the torture and killing of wounded non-combatant 
civilians—are acts that are viewed with universal abhorrence.”57 
Interestingly, the court then went on to suggest that the same may not be 
said for foreign activity that, while it may be tortious under Florida law, does not 
violate international law. The court noted that although torture and summary 
execution were actionable because they violated international law, the court’s 
holding did not interfere with the “generally accepted premise that acts of legitimate 
warfare cannot be made the basis for individual liability, and that each belligerent 
has an undoubted right to exercise all the rights of war against the other.”58 In short, 
state tort law could not impose liability for the foreign conduct if it was 
permissible where it occurred. But where the conduct violated universal norms of 
international law applicable everywhere, state law could provide the vessel through 
which those norms might entitle plaintiffs to relief in U.S. court. 
 
53. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 33–35 (1974). 
54. Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 335 (11th Cir. 1992). 
55. Id. at 333–34. 
56. Id. at 336 (emphasis added). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 337 (citations omitted). 
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B. General Jurisdiction 
Another important question in human rights cases alleging foreign harms is 
whether defendants subject to general jurisdiction in U.S. forums may, as a result, 
also be subject to forum law, even for activity outside the forum.59 Unlike 
postconduct presence, which is more likely to provide the personal jurisdiction 
hook for human being defendants, the answer to this general jurisdiction question 
holds major legal consequences for corporate defendants doing business in 
multiple jurisdictions. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that the relevant tests governing personal 
jurisdiction and choice of law are constitutionally different, or that “examination 
of a State’s contacts may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law purposes.”60 Indeed, a very recent Supreme Court decision on 
personal jurisdiction observes, “A sovereign’s legislative authority to regulate 
conduct may present considerations different from those presented by its 
authority to subject a defendant to judgment in its courts.”61 Thus, just because a 
U.S. forum has personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant does not necessarily 
mean that the forum may apply forum law to the defendant’s foreign activities. In 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, for example, an insured’s widow 
moved to Georgia and sued a Massachusetts insurance company there on a policy 
that had been entered into in New York.62 The company evidently did enough 
business in Georgia to subject itself to personal jurisdiction in Georgia courts, but 
because the policy had been issued in New York and the insured had died there, 
the Supreme Court found the application of Georgia substantive law 
unconstitutional.63 
The Supreme Court’s recent general jurisdiction opinion, Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown,64 opens up a few options for addressing whether 
general adjudicative jurisdiction over a defendant can translate into general 
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate that defendant’s conduct everywhere. On one 
hand, forums that the Court identified as “paradigm forums” for general personal 
jurisdiction over defendants may have contacts sufficient also to justify general 
prescriptive jurisdiction over the defendants’ conduct, even if the conduct occurs 
outside the forum. According to the Court, “For an individual, the paradigm 
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a 
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly 
 
59. See Childress, supra note 28. 
60. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
61. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011). 
62. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936). 
63. Id. Although the Court relied primarily on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the analysis is 
the same under the Due Process Clause, and the two have since been combined. See Hague, 449 U.S. 
at 308 & n.10. Indeed, one member of the Court has since observed that “John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. 
is probably best understood as a due process case.” Id. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
64. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011). 
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regarded as at home.”65 To the extent these contacts align with the defendants’ 
citizenship, applying forum law to defendants’ activities looks constitutional under 
both general personal jurisdiction and general prescriptive jurisdiction since states 
generally may regulate the conduct of their citizens abroad, easing fair notice 
concerns.66 Again, the possibility of this happening is not far-fetched. At least one 
court so far has found that state (or, more precisely, district) law applied to a U.S. 
corporation’s conduct abroad on the grounds that “the United States, the leader of 
the free world, has an overarching, vital interest in the safety, prosperity, and 
consequences of the behavior of its citizens, particularly its super-corporations 
conducting business in one or more foreign countries.”67 
Of course, corporations may—and likely do—try to avoid this result by 
restructuring. This raises another issue opened up but left unresolved by the Court 
in Goodyear : the relationship between jurisdictional principles and the underlying 
substantive law of corporations. Plaintiffs in Goodyear belatedly tried to get 
personal jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear via a “‘single 
enterprise’ theory, asking [the Court] to consolidate petitioners’ ties to North 
Carolina with those of Goodyear USA.”68 Such a strategy would also seem 
applicable to gaining prescriptive jurisdiction over, or justifying the application of 
forum law to, a foreign subsidiary’s activity abroad. For both personal adjudicative 
jurisdiction and prescriptive choice-of-law purposes, plaintiffs have available a 
number of options rooted in the underlying substantive law. 
One option would be to try to “pierce the veil” as the Supreme Court 
suggested in Goodyear.69 If the entities are in effect merged into a single enterprise, 
the argument goes, the U.S. parent entity’s home forum not only can hail the 
merged enterprise into court but also may apply forum law to all of the 
enterprise’s activities. Another option would be to use agency theories to show 
that the foreign subsidiary had acted as an agent of the U.S. parent.70 Finally, and 
relatedly, plaintiffs could demonstrate that the U.S. parent’s conduct in the United 
States contributed to the foreign harm.71 Any of these techniques likely establishes 
 
65. Id. 
66. See Colangelo, supra note 8, at 99–100. 
67. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. Civ.A.01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL 516744, at *2 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 2, 2006), rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the District Court’s choice of law 
determination); see also Friends for all Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 587 F. Supp. 180, 191 
(D.D.C. 1984) (“[U]nder the interest analysis approach to choice of laws . . . foreign jurisdictions have 
no interest in applying their law to damages issues if it would result in less protection to their 
nationals in a suit against a United States corporation.”). 
68. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857. 
69. Id. 
70. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30–32 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing 
and applying agency and veil-piercing theories in this context). 
71. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 26 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The 
complaints at issue concern aiding and abetting liability where at least some of the conduct causing 
harm to the plaintiffs in Indonesia occurred in the United States.”). 
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contacts with the forum sufficient to justify not only personal jurisdiction in the 
forum’s courts but also the application of forum law. 
The flip side of this general personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law question 
involves foreign corporations that do substantial, continuous, and systematic 
business in the United States such that they are subject to general jurisdiction in a 
U.S. forum. The question here is, do these contacts with the U.S. forum also 
authorize the general application of forum law to the foreign corporation’s foreign 
activities? Some courts have said yes, but have mixed up personal jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law tests—for example, justifying the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law to foreign activities of foreign corporations because the corporations have 
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the U.S. forum under tests laid out in 
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decisions.72 The relevant jurisprudence in this 
context, however, concerns constitutional limits on choice of law, not on personal 
jurisdiction.73 
In sum, the choice of state law to regulate foreign activity in suits between 
foreigners presents complex issues of fair notice, particularly when the only nexus 
with the forum is a party’s postconduct move or the general personal jurisdiction 
of the forum’s courts arising out of contacts unrelated to the suit. In choosing the 
applicable law, courts should be cognizant of the constitutional limits on their 
choice of law and should take care to rely on apposite Supreme Court 
jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause. 
II. SPATIAL LEGALITY: COMPLIANCE 
Another formal rule-of-law element captured by due process in the context 
of litigation alleging foreign conduct and harms is the avoidance of contradictory 
laws. An example in the single-state context would be avoiding laws that contain 
simultaneous contradictory commands, such that compliance is impossible.74 For 
instance, imagine a law that commanded everyone to sit and stand at the same 
time. Such a law would contradict itself and undermine the ideal of the rule of law 
within that state’s legal system. 
In multistate systems like the international system, the contradictory law 
problem also can arise when different states’ laws overlap and contain 
contradictory commands. Instead of one contradictory law emanating from one 
sovereign, there are multiple contradictory laws emanating from multiple 
sovereigns. U.S. courts have shielded parties from the operation of U.S. law under 
 
72. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
73. There is also a body of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence disfavoring 
extraterritoriality that, while not legally apposite because it does not apply in the international context, 
suggests that permitting U.S. forums to regulate foreign activities of foreign entities over which a 
forum has personal jurisdiction is bad policy because it frustrates commerce. This point has been 
expanded upon elsewhere. See Colangelo, supra note 8, at 102–104. 
74. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 65–66. 
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the Due Process Clause in these types of situations where compliance with both 
U.S. and foreign law in the place where conduct occurs is impossible. According 
to the Supreme Court, these situations arise when parties are able to show that 
“[foreign] law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the 
United States, or claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is 
otherwise impossible.”75 Thus in Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, the Supreme Court held that compelling a party to 
violate a foreign sovereign’s nondisclosure laws in foreign territory would 
effectively put the party in a legally impossible position and deprive it of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment.76 The relevant defense in U.S. law is the  
so-called “foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine.”77 Unlike the related act of state 
doctrine, which blocks U.S. courts from judging acts of foreign sovereigns in their 
own territories for political and diplomatic reasons, foreign sovereign compulsion 
blocks U.S. law from clashing with a foreign sovereign’s laws in its own territory 
to protect parties’ rights. More specifically, the doctrine protects parties from 
being “caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place where compliance 
with one country’s laws results in violation of another’s.”78 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. illustrates how the defense might play out. 
Indonesian villagers brought suit in U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia against Exxon and a number of related entities, as well as an unrelated 
Indonesian entity, for human rights abuses in Indonesia.79 Plaintiffs alleged that 
their family members were tortured during a period of civil unrest in Indonesia’s 
Aceh province between 1999 and 2001,80 and sought, through a variety of 
statutory and common law causes of action, to attach liability to the corporate 
defendants operating in the province at the time. In addition to claims under the 
ATS and Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), plaintiffs also brought common 
law tort claims for wrongful death, assault, battery, arbitrary arrest and detention, 
false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
 
75. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403 cmt. e, 
§ 415 cmt. j. Note that the Court in Hartford Fire did not find this to be the case because while the 
foreign law permitted the conduct prohibited under U.S. law, it did not require it. 
76. Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 
357 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1958) (“It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a 
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing 
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.”). It should be noted that the cases in this area require 
good faith. Thus, if the party attempts to use foreign law to evade U.S. law, the defense will not apply. 
Id. at 212; see also Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, The Restatement and Foreign Sovereign Compulsion: 
A Plea for Due Process, 23 INT’L LAW. 593, 599–600 (1989). 
77. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
78. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 441, 442 (1987). 
79. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
80. Id. at 346–47; Reuters, Exxon to Face Lawsuit over Rights Violations in Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2007 at B2. 
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negligence (in hiring and supervision), and conversion against the corporate 
defendants.81 
The addition of the common law claims yielded immediate favorable results 
in the district court. The court initially dismissed the ATS and TVPA claims 
entirely for failure to state a claim, in large part because of potential interference 
with U.S. foreign policy and Indonesia’s sovereignty.82 In fact, while the motion 
was pending, U.S. District Court Judge Louis F. Oberdofer solicited the State 
Department’s opinion on whether adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims would interfere 
with U.S. foreign policy.83 Along with a letter from the Indonesian ambassador 
explaining that the Indonesian government “cannot accept the extra territorial 
jurisdiction of a United States Court,” the State Department sent a mixed 
message.84 On the one hand, the State Department opined that the litigation 
“would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of 
the United States.”85 On the other hand, these potential effects on U.S.-Indonesia 
relations “[could not] be determined with certainty.”86 After dismissing all of the 
ATS and TVPA claims, the court dismissed all claims against PT Arun LNG Co., 
an entity fifty-five percent owned by the Indonesian government, as 
“nonjusticiable” because, according to the court, keeping PT Arun in the suit 
would “create a significant risk of interfering with Indonesian affairs and thus U.S. 
foreign policy concerns.”87 
However, the district court found that the common law tort claims against 
Exxon and its related entities, including Exxon Mobil Indonesia, were actionable 
and justiciable.88 Echoing the sovereignty concerns that had helped wipe out the 
federal statutory claims entirely, the court cautioned the parties to “tread 
cautiously” on the common law claims and conduct discovery “in such a manner 
so as to avoid intrusion into Indonesian sovereignty.”89 The court concluded that 
allowing the claims to proceed “should alleviate the State Department’s concerns 
about interfering with Indonesia’s sovereign prerogatives while providing a means 
for plaintiffs to obtain relief through their garden-variety tort claims.”90 After 
plaintiffs’ opportunity to amend the complaint and the parties’ opportunity to 
brief the choice-of-law issue, the court found that District of Columbia law 
 
81. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d at 346. 
82. Id. at 347–48; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24–28 (D.D.C. 
2005). 
83. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 22. 
84. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d at 359 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Deferred Appendix 
at 188, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F. 3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-7162)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
85. Id. at 347 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
86. Id. at 354 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
87. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 28. 
88. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d at 353. 
89. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
90. Id. at 30. 
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applied to all of the common law claims except the wrongful death claim, which 
was governed by Delaware law.91 The claims were later dismissed for lack of 
prudential standing.92 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reinstated the ATS claims and 
the “non-federal tort claims,” and held that Indonesian, not District of Columbia 
or Delaware, law applied to the latter.93 
A variant of the foreign sovereign compulsion issue arose in the district 
court proceedings while the non-federal tort claims were still purportedly 
governed by District of Columbia and Delaware law.94 In its motion for summary 
judgment, Exxon argued that it could not be held liable for the actions of 
Indonesian government forces that allegedly harmed the plaintiffs because Exxon 
was actually required to employ the forces under Indonesian law.95 More 
specifically, Exxon argued that it could not be directly liable for negligent hiring 
and supervision of the Indonesian forces or vicariously liable for their activities 
because Exxon was “required by Indonesian law to have military security 
personnel on site.”96 The district court rejected these arguments, finding that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether, under U.S. tort principles of 
employer liability for independent contractors and master-servant relationships, 
Exxon could be found liable.97 Had the court concluded that Exxon was actually 
and legally forced to employ the government forces and had no control over them 
under Indonesian law, foreign sovereign compulsion could have kicked in to block 
the application of U.S. law. Exxon’s defense also raises important questions now 
that the D.C. Circuit has concluded that Indonesian law applies to the claims. 
If Exxon was acting pursuant to Indonesian law, or Indonesian law at the very 
least permitted Exxon’s conduct, presumably those claims fail. 
Although due process operating through the doctrine of foreign sovereign 
compulsion may relieve defendants of liability under distinctly U.S. law for foreign 
acts compelled by foreign law, we think the doctrine should not apply where the 
acts would also incur liability under international law. There is much to say on this 
topic, and more will be said.98 It potentially pits not only international law but also 
U.S. laws (like the ATS) that serve as vessels for international law against laws of 
foreign sovereigns in their own territories. For now, let us take a step toward 
 
91. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. Civ.A.01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL 516744, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 2, 2006). 
92. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2009). 
93. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
94. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2008). 
95. Id. at 25. 
96. Id.; see also id. at 20 (“The Indonesian Government may designate an asset as a ‘Vital 
National Object,’ which requires military security protection. Defendants contend that, since 1983, 
the Indonesian Government has designated the Arun Field such a Vital National Object.”) (citation 
omitted). 
97. Id. at 23–30. 
98. One of us intends to write an article about compliance with overlapping contradictory 
laws. See Colangelo, supra note 8, at 125 n.290. 
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addressing the topic with an observation that may end up resolving most cases for 
most courts: there should be no real conflict of laws since foreign law generally 
will not compel offenses for which liability exists under international law. The 
whole reason offenses like torture, genocide and crimes against humanity exist to 
begin with and incur liability under international law is that states overwhelmingly 
agree on that law. Naturally there may be disagreement on the scope and contours 
of the offenses, but in most cases it will be difficult to demonstrate that foreign 
law requires the commission of international law offenses. It follows, however, 
that in foreign sovereign compulsion situations U.S. courts cannot use domestic 
laws like the ATS to expand the contours of liability beyond existing international 
law and thereby impose uniquely U.S. laws on foreign defendants “caught between 
the proverbial rock and a hard place,”99 where compliance with uniquely U.S. law 
would impose liability under the law of the place of the conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Human rights litigation in state courts and under state law raises novel and 
complex issues involving the choice of U.S. state, as opposed to federal, law to 
regulate conduct outside the United States. This symposium contribution used the 
concept of spatial legality to identify outer limits on the ability of courts to choose 
U.S. state law to regulate activity abroad in light of two main rights of defendants 
protected by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. First, application of uniquely 
U.S. law, like state tort law, to foreign conduct could defeat defendants’ right to 
fair notice of the law if no jurisdictional nexus to the U.S. forum exists save for 
defendants’ postconduct presence or amenability to general jurisdiction in the 
forum wholly unrelated to the claims giving rise to the suit. Second, application of 
uniquely U.S. law, like state tort law, to activity abroad that is compelled by the 
foreign law governing the place where the activity occurred could defeat 
defendants’ rights to compliance with the law. The discussion also suggested, 
however, that due process should be satisfied in both of these situations where the 
U.S. law faithfully incorporates or reflects an existing international law that 
imposes liability. Courts have notoriously flexible methodologies with which to 
make choice-of-law determinations involving the application of state law. 
Translating these methodologies to the international system in the context of 
human rights claims arising abroad raises new questions about the outer limits of 
that flexibility. This contribution hopefully set out some useful parameters in 
which to work. 
  
 
99. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 441, 442 (1987). 
